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'l'Hl1J

v. PHILIP

Witnesses-Cross-examination-Scope.~ The

crossscope
been
examination should be confined to matters which
Civ.
elicited from the witness on direct examination.
§
!d.-Cross-examination-Latitude Allowed.-The chief object
of cross-examination is to test the
knowledge and
recollection of the witness, and it should be
wide latiparticularly in cases involving a witness
a defendant in a criminal prosecution.
!d.-Cross-examination-Bringing Out Entire Conversation.'Vhere a witness testified as to part of a conversation on direct
examination, then on cross-examination the whole of the conversation may be elicited, at least so far as it is germane.
[4] !d.-Cross-examination-Bringing Out Entire Transaction.The mere fact that an officer in a homicide case testified on
direct examination about certain phases of his inspection of an
apartment, his observations of deceased's body and his conversation with defendant does not authorize an unrestricted line
of cross-examination of anything that he may have heard from
third persons while he was in the apartment; such remarks
and comments, being in the nature of unsworn statements made
by various third persons who had not been called as witnesses,
and who had merely inspected the premises and expressed
their personal views or opinions, were inadmissible hearsay and
not proper cross-examination.
[5] Criminal Law-Instructions-Witnesses.-Where the prosecution in a homicide case called several witnesses to testify to
the degree of t·igor nw1·tis
in deceased's body when
they saw it, an instruction that neither side was required to
produce all witnesses who might be able to testify to that particular fact was proper, since otherwise there would be a
repetitious recital of testimony which would prolong the trial
Sec Cal.Jur., Witnesses, § 77; Am.Jur.,
[2] See Cal.Jur., Witnesses, § 76; Am.Jur.,
et seq.
McK. Dig. References:
~ 133;
41
Criminal Law, § 894;
§1432;
10]
§120(2);
Witnesses,
Criminal
§ 1341(5); [13] Criminal Law, § 1377.
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would bave
Id.~Instrnctions~Circumstantial Evidence.-~In

prop<·r to instrud that where the
or two constructions it
the
to dP:!:endant's
circumstantial evidence is Telied
the facts
a
be entirely (:onsistent with the
be inconsistent with any other rational

conclusion.
Id.-Instructions-Circumstantial Evidence.-In a case which
rests
on circumstantial evidence, it is error to refuse
an instrudion that each fact which is essential to complete
a chain of circumstances that will establish defendant's
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
!d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Instructions-Circumstantial
Evidence.-In a case resting entirely on circumstantial evi~
the court's failure to
an instruction that eaeh fact
essential to eomplete the chain of circumstances against defendant must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt did not
result in a miscarriage of justice within the purview of Const.,
art. VI, § 47~, where the jury was correetly instructed on the
doctrine of reasonable doubt, the law applicable where evidence
is susceptible of different constructions, the principle that circumstantial evidence of defendant's guilt must be inconsistent
with any other rational hypothesis, and other related matters.
Witnesses-Cross-examination-Defendants in Criminal Cases.
-Where a defendant takes the stand and makes a general
denial of the crime with which he is charged, the permissible
scope of cross-examination iR very wide.
[10] !d.-Cross-examination-Defendants in Criminal Cases.·where defendant had bl'en questioned on direct examination
about his background and specifically with regard to his education, in response to which he related his graduation from
high school, his one semester of college and his training with
the Maritime Service, he eould properly be cross-examined as
to his attendance at radio-television classes.
[11] Id.- Cross-examination- Collateral Matters.- Defendant's
cross~examination on collateral matters having no purpose
other than to degrade him, such as casting aspersions on his
reasons for wearing an Army uniform that he was entitled to
wear, and offering evidence to show an attempt to
a discharge from the Army, was improper.
[12] Criminal Law--Appeal-Harmless and Reversible ErrorMiscarriage of Justice.-A "miscarriage of justice," within the
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should be declared
when
after an examination of the entire case, including
is of the opinion that it is
probable
that a result more favorable to tbe appealing
would have
been reached in the absence of the error.
[13] !d.-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Cross-examination.-In a homicide case, error in permitting the crossexamination of defendant as to certain acts not relevant to
issue in the case did not result in a miscarriage of justice,
he gave an explanation of both acts designed to remove
any derogatory effect that otherwise might have resulted from
the prosecution's inquiry, where it did not appear reasonablv
probable that the jury was influenced by such evidence to d~
fendant's prejudice or that the admission of such evidence
affected the verdict, and where it was not reasonably probable
that a result more favorable to defendant would have been
reached in the absence of error in refusing to give an additional instruction relating to circumstantial evidence.
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco. Twain Michelsen, Judge.
Affirmed.
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Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction of second
degree murder, affirmed.
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Leslie C. Gillen, Gregory S. Stout and William F. Cleary
for Appellant.
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Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn,
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Victor Griffith and John S.
Mcinerny, Deputy Attorneys General, Thomas C. Lynch, District Attorney (San Francisco), and Cecil F. Poole, Assistant
District Attorney, for Respondent.
SPENCE, J.-Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction of second degree murder. His wife, Arlys Watson,
was killed on February 15, 1953, in their San Francisco
apartment. Defendant's conviction rests on circumstantial
evidence. He does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction, but he argues these points
as grounds for reversal: (1) the restriction of the defense's
cross-examination of one of the prosecution witnesses, Officer
Mullen; (2) the giving of an instruction that neither the
prosecution nor the defense was required to call as witnesses
all persons present "at the events involved in the evidence";
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the
of an instrnction requiring, in substance,
essential fact in a chain of circumstantial
must
a reasonable doubt; and (4) the overruling
obiectiou to certain cross-examination
defendant.
and {4) raise any serious question, but a
of the records leads us to the conclusion
there
no prejudicial error resulting in a
of
of
be
" and the
art. VI, §
defendant was 26 and his
was
He was then an
corporal, stationed in San Franand was due to be discharged on March 19, 1953. The
were married in J nne, 1952, and lived in an upstairs
furnished apartment. Apparently there was no particular
friction between them.
February 15, 1953, was a Sunday. At 7 :00 that evening
utLL~:::uul:t''"' telephoned to the police that he had just found
his wife dead in their apartment. Officer Mullen was the
:first official at the scene. Defendant met him there and took
him to the bathroom, where he found Arlys lying in the
bathtub, with her ·Iegs bent in a jack-knife position and with
her head partially submerged, although neither the nose nor
mouth was under water. Officer Mullen noted a red-brown
about 4 or 5 inches wide that ran down the back of the
tub (from
top of Arlys' head into the water) and the
water was bloody. The bathroom walls were clean and the
was dry. He noticed that the body was rigid, and he
no effort to remove it from the tub. He saw black and
blue marks on the deceased's :fingers but no wounds on the
body. He noted that the bed was unmade but that everything
else in the bedroom seemed to be in order. Defendant apnervous.
Shortly after Officer Mullen's arrival, Inspectors Flynn
and Thompson reached the scene, followed by ambulance
Hynes and ambulance steward Zielinsky. The latter
two, after removing the deceased from the tub to a mat on
bathroom floor, made a brief examination of the body.
Zielinsky testified that the body was very stiff and rigid;
that there was some bleeding from a matted mass of hair
in the back of deceased's head but no wounds were visible;
and that her hands were brnised. He removed a
from
the bed and covered the body. At that time there was a rosecolored bedspread on the unmade bed. The landlady of the
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"Le~rnrtea that the rose-colored
but that when the W atsons rented the
stated that
had a bedspread of their own and would
the rose-colored one on the divan in the
room
and that
as February 9,
she had seen a
white
on the bed. Defendant
not to
know what had become of this white
He stated
that some two or three months
he had burned a
m
the
to know of such '"'V'~"'""·
either he or his wife threw it in the
can. It was
the
that defendant had killed
in the bedroom; that the white
had become
bloodstained and that defendant
of 1t before
called the
The white bedspread was not produced.
Two coroner's deputies next arrived at the
and
the ambulance men departed. After cleaning up the bathroom, the coroner's men left with the body. Defendant testified that he then notified the military authorities, but neither
then nor later did he attempt to communicate with his or his
wife's parents. He further testified that Officer Mullen told
him that all there was left for him to do was to appear at
the coroner's inquest in about six weeks, advised him against
remaining in the apartment that night, and left.
About 9:30 that evening the coroner's office rethe death to Inspector Neider of the homicide detail,
and shortly thereafter he and Inspector VanDervoort went
to the v,r atson apartment. The door was locked, and the
landlady admitted them. The apartment
to be in
order, and there was no evidence of breakage or a forced
Money was found in the deceased's purse, standing
on the bureau, and there was no evidence of robbery. Neider
learned from the Army authorities that defendant was
ing at a certain downtown hotel, and the two inspectors went
there. Defendant was not in his room but after searching
the neighborhood, they found him on the street about 10 :30
that evening, and they took him to the Hall of Justice for questioning. The story defendant then told the
police and during subsequent interrogation, as well as at
the
was substantially the same. He admitted that Saturday night, February 14, 1953, he and wife had a disagreement over the fact that she had sent him a Valentine and
he had failed to remember her, but he denied that they had
a serious argument then or at any other time.
Defendant stated that on the morning of February 15,
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wife
she ·wanted to take a
that
wanted to clean the house in preparation for an expected
house
who was coming the next week. He stated that
J,e then went to make the bed, that as he grasped the bedstarted to bleed again, and he went to get
his
n fresh bandage ; that his wife told him that she would take
('are of the bed; and that he then decided to go out for awhile.
left the apartment about 12:30 p.m., first taking two
to a nearby laundromat. He then drove to
Half Moon Bay, sunned himself on the beach for about half
nn hour, but left 'vhen it became windy. After his arrest, sand
was L1iscon'red in defendant's shoes and socks. Defendant
"1nted that he then went to Sutro's Baths for a swim, using
own
suit. After leaving Sutro
defendant
c,tat(•d that he started toward home, stopping first about
p.m. at a drugstore to buy his wife a heart-shaped box of
in view of his Valentine Day oversight next going
to a bar where he had a couple of beers, then proceeding to a
store to
a pint of ice cream, and finally arhome about 7 p.m. The "\Vatsons' normal dinner hour
\Yas about 8 p.m. on Sundays. 'rhe box of candy and cDrton
of ice cream vvere found in the kitchen by the police. Defendant stated that upon entering his apartment he searched
for his ·\\'ife and found her in the bathtub; that he started
to lift her, realized that she was dead, desisted, and then
the police. The clothing that defendant stated
was
that Sunday-a civilian sports suit-when
he undertook to remove his wife from the bathtub was found
at the hotel where he later registered that night; and all
the clothing, including the jacket, was dry. Defendant stated
that hP ai(l not get any of his clothing wet at that time.
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defendant's alibi, the
produced
of a cab driver that he had seen defendant
sometime between 12 noon and 1 p.m. that Sunday near a
certain bar in Daly City. This was on an entirely different
route from the oue defendant stated that he had taken.
Another cab driver and also the wife of the bartender testified
that they had seen defendant near or in the bar at about 1 :30
p.m. that day. Defendant at all times denied that he had
been in Daly City on that Sunday.
It was the theory of the prosecution that defendant
killed his wife in the bedroom before leaving the apartment
that Sunday morning; that he then went out to build up an
elaborate alibi, and hid or made some disposition of the
bloody bedclothes-the previously mentioned white bedspread
and a certain yellow blanket which the police learned had
been in the apartment but which, like the white bedspread,
was never found; that defendant returned home before 7 p.m.,
cleaned up the apartment to hide the evidence of any struggle,
and placed his wife in the bathtub to make the death look
like an accident.
The building in which the W atsons occupied an upstairs
apartment was so constructed that the tenant below could
hear any noises or sounds which might occur above him.
The tenant testified that on that Sunday morning between
10, when he arose, and 10 :30, when he left, there was
no unusual sound from the \Vatson apartment; nor were
there any unusual sounds between 12:30 and 2 :30 p.m. or
between 4 :30 and 6 p.m., when he was again in his apartment. Both this tenant and the landlady in the building
testified that on the preceding Saturday, February 14, they
heard noises emanating from the Watson apartment, as if
furniture was being moved. Upon this premise, the prosecution maintained that the homicide did not occur during the
recited hours that the tenant below was in his apartment,
and that the Saturday noises were caused by Mrs. \Vatson's
cleaning activities that day, with the result that she had no
reason for staying home Sunday to do the already-completed
work. A neighbor in adjoining premises testified that sometime between 10 :30 a.m. and 12 noon that Sunday morning,
she heard three or more unusual thumping noises coming
from the \Vatson apartment. No witness testified to hearing
any screams or shouts from the Watson apartment that Sunday morning.
An autopsy on the deceased's body revealed some lacera-
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distributed in the back and central
of her head. She had a bruise on her
her neck
was bruised as if she had been choked, and she had a small
bruises over
on her chin. There ·were
backs of both hands and
the
characterthem
defensive contusions caused when she
her
over her head to ward off the blows as she was struck
behind. 'l'hcrc 1vas no sknll fracture but there had
from the head lacerations. The brain

No
water vms present in the lungs. 'rhrre was no evidence of a
attack. Apparently, the death was due to multiple
injurirs to the head, with contusions and concus·
sion of the brain caused by use of a heavy blunt instrument.
The death instrument was never found.
'l'hc time factor was a Yital element in the case, and the
presented medical testimony bearing on thii-i
Two medical experts testified as to their examination
contents of the deceased's stomach, one fixing the
death as having occurred one hour, and the other fixing it as
one to two hours after the last meal had been eaten. As noted
defendant stated that he and his wife had breakfast
between 10 and 11 that Sunday morning; and he left the
apartment about 12 :30 p.m. In relation to the setting~ in of
mortis, these mPdical experts agreed that eight hours
after death would be the normal period required for a body
or the age and condition of deeeased's to reach the state of
rigidity which had bern described by other witnesses in reciting their observations at the time they went to defendant's
apartment about 7 :30 p.m. that Sunday. Again this would
fix the tinlC of death as about 11 :30 a.m., which was before
defendant stated that he left the apartment. ·with r0gard
to whether the deceas0d's body had long been immersed in
these medical experts testified that normally skin wrinlding in certain areas occurs about one hour after immersion
and remains present for about 22 to 24 hours. There was no
skin wrinkling when the body was examined some 17 or 18
hours after removal ft·om the tub.
'fhe eivilian doihei-i that dPfendant had worn that Sunday
were found in tht~ hotel room where lw went that evening.
[nelu<1ed with this (~lothing was a pair nf so(·k~ stuffed into
h shoefi. TherP were hloodstailii-i 011 tlH' soles of the soeks~-
later determined to be both ''A'' and '' 0 ''
of blood;
the deceased's was ''A'' and defendant's was '' 0.'' De-
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fendant testified that after Officer Mullen left him in the
apartment, he finished cleaning the bathroom, including some
of the bloody water that fell on the bathroom floor when the
body was removed. He did this work in his stocking feet.
No other bloodstains were found on defendant's clothing.
On Sunday night, February 15, following defendant's interrogation at the Hall of Justice relative to the homicide,
defendant was asked to remove his clothes for examination
of his body. At that time it was observed that defendant
had some scratches and bruises on his body, apparently recent
ones and as to which he was only able to give a partial explanation: a bruise on his knee attributed to rifle range
practice the preceding day, Saturday, and the cut on his right
index finger resulting from his opening the beer can that
Sunday morning; but he could not account for scratches
found on his right forearm and left upper chest.
Police criminologists and inspectors made several scientific
examinations of the \V atson apartment, the first being on
February 16. Numerous small bloodstains were found on
the east wall of the bedroom (near the bed), which proved
to be "0" (defendant's) blood. The bedroom rug near that
same side wall appeared to have been rubbed or washed, but
was dry; and when sprayed with luminal, that portion of
the rug indicated the presence of blood. A luminous reaction
was found between the bed and the east wall of the bedroom,
going toward the bathroom. No bloodstains were found on
the bathroom walls. Examination of the living-room furniture
disclosed a few bloodstains on the undersurface of the divan
(both "A" and "0" blood). The rose-colored bedspread
which was found on the bed (though presumably it was
originally on the divan according to the prosecution's evidence
as above noted) also contained bloodstains (in the main
"0" type but also some "A").
On the circumstantial evidence which has been summarized,
the jury returned a verdict of second degree murder. Defendant does not contend that the evidence is insufficient to
support the conviction, but he relies for reversal upon four
a:-;signments of error.
First to be considered is defendant's complaint of the
restriction of the defense's eros~Hxamination of Police Officer
Mullen. [1] lt is generally reeognized that the scope of
eross-examination should be eon fined to matters which have
been elicited from the witness on direct examination. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 2048.) The prosecution's objections in the main
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The re<:onl shows that appu hl i··· officials PXam iw'd the deeeat;ed
that
•~vt'll
hc•iween 7 :F•
:±5 p.m : Ollie(•!' l\luil<'ll; tlw two a.mbulaJ!(~e men, HynP"
Zi('linsky; the two poliee inspector;;, l•'lynn and 'l'hompson: and th0 1wo curo1H:r ':;; men. Officer Mullen was the firt;t
ie(: officer to arrive on the scene, and he remained thert•
the"e others came and went. Of this group, the
pros~'<:ution only called the two ambulance men, in addition
to Ofiieer Mullen, as witnesses. The defense in the main was
a1i empting to get in the record, through cross-examination
of Officer Mullen, conversations between Officer Mullen and
the public officials above mentioned who did not testify at
the trial; also various comments and remarks that Officer
l\Iullen may have heard these persons make while they were
in the apartment.
[2] 'rhe chief object of cross-examination is to test the
credibility, knowledge, and recollection of the witness. It
should be given wide latitude, particularly in cases involving
" witness against a defendant in a criminal prosecution."
Cal.Jur. § 76, p. 97; People v. Whitehead, 113 Cal.App.
2d 43, 48 [247 P.2c1 717] .) [3] Thus, it is undisputed that
vvhcre a witness testifies as to part of a conversation on direct
examination, then on cross-examination, the whole of the
conversation may be elicited, at least so far as it is germane.
J\Ioreover, section 1854 of the Code of Civil Procedure proYid(:s: "\Vhen part of an act, declaration, conversation, or
writing is given in evidence by one party, the ·whole on
the same subject may be inquired into by the other; ... and
when a detached act, declaration, conversation, or writing
is given in evidence, any other act, declaration, conversation
or writing, vvhich is necessary to make it understood, may
also be given in evidence.'' This section was applied in
People v. ·whitehead, supra, in reversing a murder conviction
beeause of improper limitations imposed in the cross-examination of a prosecution witness. There the court prohibited
c·ross-examination of the witness on certain conversation between the deceased and defendant at the time of the killing,
a,; to which conversation "no testimony whatsoever was introduced on direct examination." (P. 49.) 'I'his ruling was
hdd to be erroneous upon the basis of the "verbal act theory,"
that ''physical acts testified to cannot be arbitrarily separated
from the verbal acts accompanying them and made at the
same time and place" (p. 49), and so "when testimony has
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\Vhitehcad ease involved a
of tl1e rule in that the
tion was to
out the conversation between the ue<.:e<•:sen
and defendant accompanying the commission of the killing.
the situation differs in that the conversations, comments and remarks which the defense sought to elicit
Officer Mullen on cross-examination, though they formed no
of his
on direct examination, concerned conversations of third persons occurring after, rather than accompanying, the happening of the crime. [4] Simply because Officer Mullen testified on direct examination about
certain phases of his own inspection of the Watson apartment, his observations of the deceased's body, and his eonversation with defendant, does not mean that the door was
thereby opened to an unrestricted line of cross-examination
upon anything· that he may have heard from third persons
while he was in the apartment. These remarks and comments, being in the nature of unsworn statements made by
various third persons who had not been called as witnesses,
and who had merely inspected the premises and expressed
their personal views or opinions, were inadmissible hearsay
and not proper cross-examination.
·while defendant makes some general complaint concerning the alleged curtailment of the cross-examination of Officer
Mullen and other prosecution witnesses, the record does not
sustain his claim. On the contrary, it appears that the trial
ecmrt was very liberal in the allowance of the defense's crossexamination of Officer Mullen, for his direct examination covered but 14 pages of the transcript while his cross-examination
covered 80 pages. There were other instances showing the
liberality of the trial court in allowing cross-examination of
prosecution witnesses: Inspector Neider's direct examination
covered 86 pages, his cross-examination169 pages; the autopsy
surgeon's direct examination covered 14 pages, his crossexamination 163 pages; and another pathologist's direct examination covered 18 pages ,his cross-examination 185 pages.
It does not appear that the trial court misapplied the principles governing the proper limitation of cross-examination,
but rather that it followed a liberal policy in its rulings.
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in
giving an instruction that neither the prosecution nor the
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who
shown to have been
at any of the events involved
in the evidence.'' He claims that the
should
called the two
and the
as to their observations
rnoriis found in the
arriYal at the \Vatson
7 :15 and 7 :4?1
m.
to his own failure
their
would
D<'frndant takes the position that since 1hese witnesses
the
it should be presumef!
their
would not have been eorrobon1ti vc of
account of prosecution \Vitnesses MuUPH ancl ihe two
ambulance men, Hynes and Zieliusky, but ratller would h::we
unfavorable to the prosecution's theory. ]<'or this prophe cites People Y. Beal, 116 Cal.App.2d 475
P.2d
, where the prosecuting witness in a rape charge failed
to produce her exarnining physician, and there was no
independent proof of the alleged offense other than her own
testimony, which varied in seYeral material particulars; ancl
.fldson v. Jnlson, 110 CaLApp.2d 797 [243 P.2d 558], where
in a divorce action, about ten persons of a group witnessed
a certain episode, no one of them was called as a witness,
no explanation \\'HS giYen therefor despite the need for corevidence, and under such circumstances the court
declared "bound to presume . . . that their testimony
wnnld be unfavorable, and was for that reason snppre~sed. ''
. 801.) [5] But the present sitnation is not comparable'
In the cited cases, for the prosecution did call several witJl(•s•ws as ahon' mentioned to testif~r 1o the drgree of riqor
Iii Or/is pre.-;e11t in the bod:v when they saw it tllnt 8nnfla.1
e\·,,nmg. 'l'he instruction that neither side was required to
al1 \dtnesses who might be able to testify to thai
pHrticnlar fact has a practical premis0. for otherwise there
wmllcl he a repetitious recital of testimony ·which \rould pro1lw trial beyond veasonahle limits. TJ nder the circumstanees, it would seem that defendant's remerly wonld havr:
lwen to have called the witncssN; on his own behalf if he
hc·lin·ed their i
woul(l have air!ed hi::; (:ause. (Se(~
v. Potcc/7, 8:l Cal.App. f)~, 67-G8 [2:JG P. !l6ll.)
The next qnestion eoncerns i he eourt 's instruetions on
eircmnstantinl evic1enee. [6] As ahoye stated, this was
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wholly a circumstantial evidence case, and the court properly
gave several instructions on the subject: That where the evidence is susceptible of two constructions, it is the jury's
duty to adopt that construction which points to defendant's
innocence (CALJIC No. 26); and where circumstantial evidence is relied upon as proof of guilt to justify a conviction.
the facts or circumstances must not only be entirely
"
>vith the theory of guilt but must be inconsistent with any
other rational conclusion ( CALJIC No. 27). (People
Bender, 27 Cal.2d 164, 175 [163 P.2d 8] ; People v. Koenig,
29 CaL2d 87, 91-93 [173 P.2d 1]; People v. Zerillo, 36
2d 222, 233 [223 P.2d 223] .) The following related CALJIC
instructions were also given: No. 21 (presumption of innocence, reasonable doubt, burden of proof) ; No. 24 (direct
and circumstantial evidence equally entitled to consideration) ; and No. 25 (direct and indirect evidence-code definitions). But the court refused to instruct in language substantially embodying CALJIC No. 28: That "When the case
which has been made out by the People against a defendant
rests entirely or chiefly on circumstantial evidence, and in
any case before the jury may find a defendant guilty basing
its finding solely on such evidence, each fact which is essential
to complete a chain of circumstances that will establish the
defendant's guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt."
Defendant argues that it was error for the court to refuse
to give a requested instruction in language substantially embodying CALJIC No. 28. People v. Bende1·, supra, People
v. Koenig, supra, and People v. Zerillo, s1tpra, were concerned
primarily with the court's error in failing to give CAL.TIC
No. 27, although in the Koenig case the refused instruction
was extended to include, in part, the principle of CALJIC
No. 28. In the Zerillo case the error was held reversible
error but not so in the Bender and Koenig cases.
In the District Courts of Appeal the adequacy of the
instructions on the principles governing circumstantial evi~
dence cases has been variously handled. Depending on the
particular record, the court's failure to give more complete
instructions on the subject was held cause for reversal in
People v. Hatchett, 63 Cal.App.2d 144, 132-J 56 [J46 P.2d
469] ; People v. Rayol, 65 Cal.App.2d 462, 465-466 [150 P.2d
8121, and People v. Tholke, 75 Cal.App.2d 857, 860-861 [171
P.2c1 904]; but not in People v. Webster, 79 Cal.App.2d 321,
327-329 [179 P.2d 633], People v. Can'd1:otto, 128 Cal.App.2d
347, 356-358 [275 P.2d 500], and People v. Perez, 128 Cat
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~Where the error in the
the <'Rscntial eonsidera~
a proper statement of thr
that eiretJTIIR1antial fWi\1ence mnst be iueonsistcnt
any other rational hypothrsis tlmn that of guilt
(CAL.HC No. 27). CAIJ,JlC No. 28 was held applicable in
the determination of a circumstantial evidence case in People
v
snpra, People v. Garnier, 95 Cal.App.2d 489, 500
P.2d 111] ; People v. Candiotto, supra, and People v
supra; but was deemed "too liberal" in People v.
103 Cal.App.2d 592, 598 [230 P.2d 52]. 'rhe latter
view was based on the premise that the law only requires that
defendant's guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt but
not that each fact in the chain of circumstances-in the
sense of ''each incident or event inculpating the defendant''
--be so proved, citing People v. Nunn, 65 Cal.App.2d 188,
195 [150 P.2d 476], and People v. Klinkenberg, 90 Cal.App.
2d 608, 632 [204 P.2d 47, 613]. Moreover the Mansour case
rested on circumstantial evidence, while in the Nunn and
Klinkenberg cases the evidence was not wholly circumstantial
but was largely direct; and "a court is not required to instruct upon the rules of law applicable to circumstantial
evidence which is incidental to and corroborative of direct
evidence." (People v. Jerman, 29 Cal.2d 189, 197 [173 P.2d
; see also People Y. Zerillo, supra, 36 Cal.2d 222, 233;
People v. Hannon, 89 Cal.App.2d 55, 60 [200 P.2d 32].
People v. Kross, 112 Cal.App.2d 602, 615 [247 P.2d 441,
and People v. Edcly, 123 Cal.App.2d 826, 835 [268 P.2d 47],
follow People v. Mansour, supra, 103 Cal.App.2d 592, 598.)
[7] Properly interpreted, CALJIC No. 28 applies the
doctrine of reasonable doubt not to proof of miscellaneous
collateral or incidental facts, but only to proof of ''each
fact which is essen6al to complete a chain of circumstances
that will establish the defendant's guilt." Although the import of the openiug phrase in CALJIC No. 28 may be somewhat confusing because of the reference to its applicability
when the People's case rests "chiefly" on circumstantial evidence, it is clearly applicable to cases such as the present
one, which rests entirely upon circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, the trial court erred in refusing to give defendant's
instruction which substantially embodied CALJIC No. 28.
(See cases collected: Stout on "Appellate Review of Criminal
Convictions on Appeal," 43 Cal.L.Rev. 381, 446-447.)
[8] However, the jury here was correctly instructed on
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, the law
where
;1 ifferPJJt coustruetiom.; (CAL-TIC
that circnml'taJJtial evidence of defendant's
must be inconsistent with any other rational hypothesis
(CAIJJIC No. 27), and other related matters as above noted.
Under these circumstances, it does not appear here
the court's failure to give a further instruction substantially
in the language of CALJIC No. 28 has "resulted in a mis.
of justice" within the meaning of the constitutional
provision as hereinafter discussed. ( Const., art. VI, §
)
Defendant :finally contends that the court erred in permitting the prosecution, over objection, to develop certain alleged
collateral matters through his cross-examination, and which
he claims could have had no purpose except to discredit and
degrade him.
[9] The :first point to be considered is the propriety of
the prosecution's questioning of defendant on the matter of
his attending a radio-television school. After eliciting on defendant's cross-examination the fact of defendant's attendance, the prosecution continued the questioning by asking
defendant as to the courses such instruction covered. Defendant's objection that such inquiry was incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial, as well as beyond the scope of his direct
examination, was overruled; and his answers indicated that
his studies there consisted of script-writing, voice projection
and related matters. While the relevancy of such inquiry
might be open to reasonable dispute, still it is generally recognized that where ''a defendant takes the stand and makes a
general denial of the crime with which he is charged, the
permissible scope of cross-examination is very wide." (People
v. Z erillo, supra, 36 Cal.2d 222, 228.) [10] Furthermore, on
direct examination, defendant had been questioned about his
background, and specifically with regard to his education.
In response to such interrogation he related his graduation
from high school, his one semester of college, his training
with the Maritime Service. Under these circumstances the
trial court did not err in allowing the prosecution's inquiry
as to defendant's attendance at radio-television classes.
Defendant's second point of objection concerns his crossexamination as to his height and related facts. On direct
examination, defendant stated that he was 6 feet 6 inches
talL On cross-examination, the prosecution asked defendant
about eertain marks on one of the door frames in his apart-
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and
to the issue.'' [11] 'I' he
but admitted eYidence was undoubtedly collateral and irrelevant
to any issue in the case. 'l'he casting of
on defendant's reasons for
an
uniform that he was
evidence to show an attempt
t>ntitled to wear, and
to
from the Army had no bearing on his
in relation to thr crime
apparently no
on collateral matters and
other purpose but to
defendant has been held re.
versible error under certain circumstances.
v. Ji'lem.
166 Cal. 357, 383 [136 P. 291, .t~nn.Cas. 1915B
;
134 Cal. 140, 142 [66 P. 174]; People v.
76 Cal.App. 178, 184 [244 P. 106].) The question
nresfmtNl is w·hether the error here requires a reversal
provisions of article VI, section 4% of the
Constitution.
This section, first adopted in 1911 with reference only to
criminal cases but amended in 1914 so as to apply as well
to civil eases, now reads: ''No :i~1dgment shall be set aside,
or new trial g·ranted, in any case, on the ground of misdirection of the jury, or of the improper admission or rejection of evidence, or for any error as to any matter of
pleading, or for any error as to any matter of procedure,
unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including
the
the court shall be of the opinion that the error
complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of :fustice."
(Emphasis added.) "While it had long been provided in our
statutory law that judgments ·would not be reversed because
of technical errors or defects which did not affect the substantial rights of the defendant (Pen. Code, §§ 1258, 1404),
the courts newrtheless in reviewing convictions in criminal
cases had generally followed the rule that prejudice would
be presumed from error and upon that basis the defendant
was "entitled to a reversal of the judgment." (People v.
Williams, 18 Cal. 187, 194; see also People v. Jrlttrphy, 47
Cal. 103, 106; Pr'ople v. Stanley, 47 Cal. 113, 119 [17 Am.Rep.
401]; People v. Ji'urtaclo, 57 Cal. 345, 347; People v. Sansome,
84 Cal. 449, 451 [24 P. 143] ; People v. Moore, 103 Cal. 508,
511 fi57 P. 510]; People v. Richards, 136 Cal. 127, 128 [68
P. 477].) The constitutional amendment added a new concept ealling for a determination by the court that the alleged
error resulted in ''a miscarriage of justice.'' To this end
the appellate court vvas required to review the evidence so
as to form an "opinion" as to whether the assigned errors
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a reversal under the
to the terms of section 4¥2 of article VL"
an exhaustive discussion of the
the
!JL.tU~'-'-V'-'0" were
: That the section abrothe former rule that
is
from error,
and allowed the reviewing court to consider the evidence to
the dedetermine whether the error did in fact
fendant; that the distinction between reversible and nonreversible error does not rest upon the distinction between
error relating to constitutional rights as contrasted with
other
but that the section applies to both ; that certain
fundamental
however, are guaranteed to the defendant upon which he can insist regardless of the state
the
such as the right to a jury trial and the right to
ur,ote,ctllOn under the plea of once in jeopardy, but that not
every invasion of a constitutional right
reversal; that generally, error involving the
a constitutional right, like any other error,
further determination whether the defendant has been
and the final test is the ''opinion'' of the rt>"tnmmn
court, in the sense of its belief or conviction, as to the
of the error; and that ordinarily where the result appears
and it further appears that such result would have
been reached if the error had not been vvxu....cuccvu,
will not be ordered. Upon this basis, the error
the 0
case was held not to be cause for r~>"trP.rf~>~
also People v. Mayfield (1927), 85 CaLApp. 77 f259 P.
[12] The controlling consideration in
the
tion is whether the error has resulted in a
'' In determining the meaning of this
reviewing courts have stated the test to be applied in
Emphasis in the main, however, has been
on the constitutional requirements of a fair trial and due
in
process, which emphasis is found in decisions
reversals (People v. Sarazzawski, 27 Cal.2d 7, 11 [161 P.2d
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of Criminal Coirdctions on
consideration to the
constitutional
it appears that
be stated as follo-ws: That
'' should be declared
when the

situations

seems to coincide with
the afiirmative language used in the constitutional provision.
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I

absence of

any
upon reasonotherwould

upon mere
the entire purpose of the constitutional
defeated.
stated to the record bPthat it is not
favorable to defendant would
have been
the cross-examination of defendant as to his
eis(•s and his letter to the
authorities.· He
of both acts
to remove any
effect that otherwise
resulted hom the prosecuprobable that
. It does not appear
was influenced
such evidence to defendant's
or that the admission of such eYidence affected the
\·erdict.
. we are of the
as heretofore indithat it is not
that a result more
fayorable
defendant would haYe been reached in the abseuee of the error in
to
the additional instruction
to circumstantial evidence. 'l'he uncontradicted evithe condition of the
of the deceased
showed that the deceased met her death during the
hours that defendant
was in the
; and
this
unerringly pointed
to def(•Hclant 's g·uilt. In short, from an "examination of the
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,J., and McComb, ,J., concurred.
concurred in the
the majority opm10n it is
of a witness
added]
from irrelevant, improper or insulting ques... to be examined only as to matters legal and
to the issue." (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2065,
2066.) ·when the "witness" is also the defendant on trial
for his life or liherty, failure to accord him that specifically
declared right takes on vastly greater import than where
the victim of the misconduct is affected only as a witness.
The majority opinion also recognizes that ''The challenged
but admitted evidence \vas undoubtedly collateral and irrelevant to any issue in the case. The casting of aspersions
on defendant's reasons for wearing an .Army uniform that he
was entitled [apparently required] to wear, and offering
evidence to show an attempt to get a discharge from the
Army had no bearing on his motive or credibility in relation
to the crime charged.'' In other words, it is conceded that
the object and effect of asking the improper questions was
to prejudice the defendant in the minds of the jurors.
Technical proof of guilt and effective persuasion of guilt
may be quite different things. For proof of guilt to sustain
the verdict on appellate review the prosecution relies upon
circumstantial evidence which, while not wholly insufficient
as a matter of law, is far from being overwhelming or even
satisfyingly convincing as a matter of substance. Many of
the suspicious circumstances are susceptible of innocent construction. 'l'he finding of guilt rests heavily upon inferences
drawn in some respects from objective facts and as to other
elements from opinion evidence. Certainly, resolution of
the conflicting inferences and of the ultimate fact is for the
jury, but when the scales of proof are so delicately balanced
it should be resolved by a jury which has heard relevant
evidence and which has not been prejudiced and thereby
persuadecl by irrelevant matters. It seems rather clear to
me that the natural result of the conceded error was a mis-
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other
relevant evidence
other than those delimited by the .,w,uuan.t"'
narration of the
unfair conduct of the
and a correct
rules of
reference is made
for the District
of
e:sJ,uuJLI£ Justice Peters and concurred iu
and Fred B.
Jr., reported at ( CaLApp.
For the reasons therein and hereinabove indicated I conclude that there has been a miscarriage of justice and would
reverse and remand for a new trial.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
In my
this ease was correctly decided
the
District
First Appellate District, Division
in an able
exhaustive opinion
by Mr.
Presiding Justice Peters and concurred in by Justices
and Wood. (Cal.App., 288 P.2d 184.) After an exhaustive
review of the evidence and an able and comprehensive discussion of the contentions of the respective parties, that opinion
concludes: ""'Ve conclude, after reading the transcript, that,
because we cannot say with conviction that, in the absence
of the errors complained of, a different verdict would have
been improbable, the judgment must be and is
and
a new trial ordered.''
The
of this court concedes, as it must, that numerous errors were committed by the trial court
the
trial of this case, but concludes that such errors were not
prejudicial to defendant and did not result in a TY>'""'~'""'
of justice, as that term is used in section 4% of article VI
of the Constitution of California.
I have heretofore had occasion to discuss the applicability
of this constitutional provision to both criminal and civil
cases
dissenting opinions, People v. Tarantino, 45 Cal.
2d 590, 604 [290 P.2d 505], and Buekley v. Chadwick, 45
Cal.2d 183, 203, 208 [288 P.2d 12, 289 P.2d
, and I
will not here take the time to review the authorities or discuss
their applicability to the case at bar. I cannot refrain from
stating that I positively do not agree with the
of
the majority here "that generally, error involving the infringement of a constitutional right, like any other error,
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for the administration of
this state are
to follow if
ment of law and not of men.
t,hat before a conviction of
it is necessary that the constitutional
which outline the
to be
and it cannot be said that
established in accordance with law if the accnsrd
denied any of the
the Constitution
and statutes of this state.
It is
of the framers
our Constitution was that
technical errors in instructions to the
or in the admission or
of evidence or errors in
or procedure which could not affect the result in a case should not
be relied upon as a ground for the
In fact this
the
and I am in full accord ·with this

In
conviction
affected
v. TaranTo my mind it is
of
Constitu-

where
errors
the substantial
45 Cal.2d 590,
obvious that this
tion has been
in recent years
of conviction may be
errors which may have been committed
court because it was the view of four members of this court
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